Myanmar is one of the most recent
countries in the world to have established a Constitutional Tribunal. Yet the
operation of the Tribunal flies in the face of assumptions common to global
constitutionalism. At present, external factors such as globalised judicial
networks or comparative concepts of rights-based review have had little
influence in Myanmar. Instead, the operation of the Tribunal can be explained
by two main internal factors and the actions, or inaction, of elite political
actors. I demonstrate this by analysing the Constitutional Tribunal under
President Thein Sein (2011-2012; 2013-2016) and then the National League for
Democracy government (2016-). In this talk I focus on the issue of the right to
vote and citizenship to illustrate when and why elites (both democrats and
dictators) use the Tribunal. Although the global community largely perceived
the 2015 elections to be free and fair, in fact the decision of the Tribunal
combined with the actions of Parliament contributed to the mass disenfranchisement
of over one million people (many of whom are Rohingya). In this respect, the
Tribunal has reinforced a limited nationalist understanding of the 2008
Constitution. As a monumental shift has taken place from direct military rule
to military-led constitutionalism in Myanmar, I offer an important and timely
reflection on the implications of the role of the Tribunal as a forum for
constitutional dialogue between military dictators and democratically elected
representatives. This talk is based on a forthcoming article in the International Journal of
Constitutional Law (2018).
Date: 18 April 2018
Location: Melbourne Law School
Hosted by the Asian Law Centre and the Centre for Statelessness, University of Melbourne
